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The title of this symposium is “Public Domain(s): Law, 
Generating Knowledge, and Furthering Innovation in the 
Information Economy.”1 In this Article, I address an emerging 
middle ground between the public domain and the exclusive right to 
exploit a technology that is otherwise afforded by patent law. I am 
referring to the emerging phenomenon of “patent pledges.” 
Patent pledges are “[public] commitments voluntarily made by 
patent holders to limit the enforcement or other exploitation of their 
patents.”2 These pledges encompass a wide range of technologies 
and firms: from promises by multinational corporations like IBM and 
Google not to assert patents against open-source software users;3 to 
commitments by developers of industry standards to grant licenses 
on terms that are fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory 
(FRAND);4 to the recent announcement by Tesla Motors that it will 
not enforce its substantial patent portfolio against any company 
making electric vehicles in “good faith.”5 
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Despite this diversity in content and form, patent pledges share 
a number of unifying features. The public nature of patent pledges 
distinguishes them from the broad array of formal licenses that 
patent holders routinely grant in commercial transactions. First, 
patent pledges are not made to direct contractual counterparties or 
business partners but to the public at large, or at least to large 
segments of certain markets.6 Second are the motivations that lead 
patent holders to make patent pledges. In general, these motivations 
fall into two broad categories: (1) inducing other market participants 
to adopt, and make investments in, a standardized technology or 
other common technology platform; and (2) “soft” factors, including 
communitarianism, altruism, and the desire for improved public 
relations.7 Broadly speaking, this Article addresses the first category 
of pledges, those that are made with an intention to induce 
movement in the relevant technology market, and which I have 
termed “actionable” pledges.8 
To understand the reasons that patent holders make such patent 
pledges, it is first important to consider the beneficial market-wide 
effects that patent pledges can have. For example, technical 
interoperability standards enable devices manufactured by different 
vendors to interoperate automatically and without significant user 
intervention. The Wi-Fi wireless networking suite of standards is a 
good example.9 Any computer, tablet, smart phone, or other device 
that implements the relevant Wi-Fi standard can communicate with 
any other device that implements the same standard. The 
manufacturers of those devices need not interact at all during the 
development and manufacturing of their respective products. So long 
as two devices comply with the relevant standard, they can 
communicate with each other.10 
The benefits that can be achieved through widespread product 
interoperability are known as “network effects” and generally 
increase as the number of compatible devices grows.11 The 
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interoperability of different vendors’ products opens markets for new 
products and services, fostering innovation, competition, consumer 
choice, and economic growth.12 As observed by the principal U.S. 
antitrust agencies, standards enabling product interoperability “are 
widely acknowledged to be one of the engines of the modern 
economy.”13 The same holds true for some software platforms, 
particularly those that are characterized by open application program 
interfaces (APIs) or are distributed in open-source form.14 The broad 
availability of such software platforms can give rise to market-wide 
cost savings and efficiencies, and can promote consumer choice and 
competition, as exemplified by the Linux and Android operating 
systems.15  
Patent pledges create an environment in which multiple firms 
are more likely to adopt particular standards or open-technology 
platforms, resulting in greater product interoperability and increased 
network effects. Why? Because the holder of patents, which might 
otherwise be used to block a competitor from developing and selling 
a compatible product, commits to limit the use of those patents. This 
commitment might come close to contributing the patent to the 
public domain, for example, by pledging not to enforce a software 
patent against any company with fewer than twenty-five 
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employees.16 At the other end of the spectrum, the pledge might 
simply be to grant royalty-bearing patent licenses on terms that are 
“fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory.”17 In both cases, patent 
owners limit their statutory right to enforce their patents.18 By doing 
so, they seek to induce market participants to adopt their preferred 
standards or technology platforms. In other words, such pledges 
create a “safe space” in which product development and innovation 
can flourish with a reduced threat of patent enforcement. Such 
commitments thus not only benefit the market broadly, but also 
guide the market toward the patent holder’s own products and 
technologies, which benefits the patent holder. Patent pledges thus 
have the potential to produce a number of beneficial market effects, 
which alone should be sufficient reason to respect and enforce them.  
However, there is another reason that patent pledges, as a 
general rule, should be treated as legally enforceable obligations. 
This justification is based on the reliance of other market actors on 
these pledges. Manufacturers who rely on a patent holder’s promise 
not to block the sale of a product will often make costly investments 
on that basis.19 These investments could include product design and 
development, marketing, materials, capital equipment, information 
technology, employee training, and supply chain management.20 
Once such investments have been made, the manufacturer is said to 
be “locked-in” and cannot switch to an alternative technology 
without significant, and potentially prohibitive, cost.21 Thus, it is 
important to enforce the patent holder’s pledge to protect other 
market actors who have relied on those pledges in making 
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investments that, in the end, are likely to have a socially beneficial 
effect. 
Various theories have been advanced regarding the most 
appropriate legal framework for enforcing patent pledges. These 
include common law contract,22 antitrust law,23 patent misuse,24 and 
other theories based in equity and property law.25 Each of these 
approaches has theoretical or practical drawbacks that I have 
previously discussed at length.26 As an alternative, I have proposed a 
new theory termed “market reliance,” which begins with the 
equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel and adds to it a rebuttable 
presumption of reliance adapted from the “fraud-on-the-market” 
theory under federal securities law.27 The market-reliance approach, 
which focuses on a patent holder’s behavior-inducing promise to the 
market, may enable patent pledges to be recognized and enforced 
without the need to prove the elements of contract formation, 
antitrust injury, or specific reliance.28 
But as I have also explained elsewhere, any reliance-based 
approach requires that the relevant promise have some degree of 
visibility to the market, even if individual market actors are not 
aware of specific pledges made with respect to specific patents.29 
Thus, pledges that are posted on a web site and taken down the next 
day, or are substantially changed after they are made, raise questions 
regarding their later enforcement. If an initial announcement 
attracted sufficient public attention, such pledges might influence 
markets significantly. Yet if their appearance and disappearance 
went unnoticed, then it is likely they would have no impact on the 
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market. And, of course, most situations will fall somewhere between 
these two extremes.30 
This situation suggests the need for state involvement in the 
preservation and dissemination of patent pledges. In order to 
eliminate factual uncertainty surrounding the sufficiency of notice to 
the market, I have proposed the creation of a publicly accessible, 
governmentally operated repository of patent pledges.31 Such a 
repository would provide a trusted source for patent pledges 
concerning specific technologies (e.g., wireless networking, 4G 
telecommunications, electric-vehicle power stations, etc.) and would 
both preserve pledges and track changes subsequently made to 
them.32 
Patent pledges have already shaped critical technology markets 
and enabled the interoperability of a vast range of products and 
services. However, as patent litigation in these markets has 
increased, the premises and assumptions underlying these pledges 
have begun to show stress. I have proposed both a theoretical 
framework (market reliance) and a practical resource (the pledge 
registry) that, it is hoped, will solidify the legal foundation for this 
critical middle ground between the public domain and market 
exclusivity. 
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